The Path Begins with Convening the First Iranian “Continental Congress”

The Time Has Come for an Exile Army — and the Path Begins with Convening the First Iranian “Continental Congress”

In a previous column, we explained why a ground campaign in Iran is a necessary condition for replacing the current regime, why a ground operation led by the Kurdish minority is not the appropriate alternative, and why an army composed of Iranian exiles under the leadership of Reza Pahlavi, accompanied by an international brigade of volunteers from around the world, holds the potential to bring about the replacement of the existing regime in Iran.

In this column, we will focus on what we believe to be a crucial preparatory step toward the formation of such an exile army: the call to convene, as soon as possible, under the auspices of Reza Pahlavi or under the sponsorship of international actors (Western or Arab), a “continental congress” of all Iranian protest movements and opposition groups. This congress would seek to adopt, through broad consensus, an official vision—temporary or long-term—for Iran in the “day after.”

Such a vision would serve as the foundation for the possible establishment of a shared organizational framework—whether “lean” or “robust”—for the entire spectrum of Iranian protest and opposition movements, which currently resemble more an archipelago of political islands than a unified movement striving toward a common goal. More importantly, it would provide the basis for launching a joint military effort—the Exile Army—aimed at toppling the current regime and liberating Iran.

For the idea of an exile army and an international volunteer brigade to materialize, a sufficient number of individuals—at least tens of thousands capable of bearing arms—must be willing to risk their lives and enter the battlefield.

Soldiers are willing to risk their lives for many reasons, ranging from the prospect of personal gain to a deep belief in the cause for which they fight. Yet belief in the cause remains a powerful force multiplier for any army and may well be the decisive factor distinguishing success from failure.

Replacing Iran’s murderous regime is a worthy objective only if the regime that replaces it proves better and offers a better life to all Iranians. It is doubtful that large numbers of volunteers would risk their lives to fight a fascist theocracy only to replace it, for example, with an oppressive monarchy—or to fight without knowing what awaits Iran, or at least what is planned for it, on the “day after.”

Therefore, if the idea of an exile army is to achieve its greatest recruitment potential and chances of success, its founders must present the Iranian public and the international community with a clear, detailed, optimistic, realistic, and credible vision for Iran in the “day after.”

This vision could be a long-term one, outlining the desired future character of the Iranian state, or a time-bound transitional vision limited to an interim period during which the Iranian people themselves would decide their future within a framework of fair and predetermined rules of the political game.

Such a vision must be clear rather than vague or open to conflicting interpretations. It must be detailed enough to be translated into concrete action plans and allow every Iranian citizen and exile to assess in advance how it might affect their future. It must be optimistic, offering meaningful improvement for all citizens of Iran, regardless of ethnicity or faith. It must be realistic in terms of the likelihood that it can actually be implemented. And above all, it must be credible.

Credibility is a dual requirement. First, Iranians must believe that those standing behind the vision are genuinely committed to implementing it in practice, rather than using it opportunistically to advance their chances of gaining political power. Second, they must believe that those promoting the vision will receive the necessary cooperation from other relevant actors in the Iranian political arena.

In July 2025, during the National Cooperation Conference held in Munich, Germany—attended by more than 500 Iranian opposition activists, civil society figures, and regime critics—Reza Pahlavi, who was the driving force behind the conference, presented for the first time a booklet titled “Emergency Phase Booklet,” created as part of the Iran Prosperity Project.

Prepared on the basis of work by experts from within Iran and across the Iranian diaspora, the booklet was designed to serve as a practical blueprint for the first 180 days following the fall of the current regime in Iran, a period during which the Iranian people would be required to make decisions regarding their country’s future.

The booklet was presented for public feedback, generated significant interest among experts and ordinary citizens alike, sparked lively discussions on social media, and led to the submission of numerous constructive comments and suggestions.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, work on the booklet has now been completed, and it is now in its final version.

It is important to note that the booklet and the detailed action plan it presents are appealing to only a portion—and some might say too limited a portion—of the relevant audiences. Some of the principles on which it is based may exclude large population groups both within Iran and among the Iranian diaspora from the camp of change.

Nevertheless, despite its shortcomings—and despite the fact that it reflects, in many respects, the vision of a specific political camp, namely the secular and liberal camp—the booklet remains, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, the only serious attempt to date to present a clear, detailed, and optimistic vision for the “day after” the fall of the current regime, even if it may not yet be sufficiently realistic or credible.

Accordingly, it constitutes the best available starting point for any effort aimed at rapidly generating a “day after” vision and attempting to mobilize the broadest possible support for it among Iranian protest and opposition movements—even if this requires diluting the vision into an even more “lean” version centered primarily on agreement regarding the fundamental rules under which the political marketplace of post-regime Iran would operate.

At the present moment, we believe that Pahlavi should mobilize his full political, moral, and symbolic influence, as well as all the resources at his disposal, to attempt to convene—under his auspices or under the sponsorship of influential international actors—an emergency congress bringing together representatives of all Iranian protest and opposition movements.

The goal would be to reach agreements—based on the booklet as a possible starting point or on an alternative proposal—regarding either a “lean” or a “robust” shared vision for Iran in the “day after,” and regarding the establishment of a joint organizational framework that would act in coordination to liberate Iran.

Such a congress, similar in spirit to the American Stamp Act Congress (the Continental Congress of 1765) could become a defining moment in the life of the future Iranian nation and a significant moral blow to the current regime, which has long benefited from the deep fragmentation that has prevented Iranian protest and opposition movements from mounting coordinated action capable of threatening its survival.

It must be emphasized that this is far from a simple task.

To date, despite numerous opportunities over the years and following multiple waves of protest, Iranian protest and opposition movements have failed to cooperate in any meaningful and sustained way. They have not succeeded in rising above the narrow—and often conflicting—interests and agendas of their respective movements in order to establish a unified organizational framework.

Their continuous failure to establish a unified organizational framework prevented the formation of a “lean” framework—such as a single umbrella organization responsible for basic coordination among protest and opposition groups—let alone of a “robust” framework, such as a shadow government capable of presenting a unified alternative leadership and a shared vision for Iran’s future.

It is therefore no coincidence that Iranian protest and opposition movements have often been described as an “archipelago of political islands,” separated by ideology, generational divides, geographic dispersion, and above all by deep mutual distrust.

Indeed, the Munich conference in July 2025 was exceptional precisely because it succeeded, for the first time, in bringing together under one roof activists from various Iranian protest and opposition movements in an attempt to reach agreements that could serve as a foundation for future joint action—albeit only from a certain segment of the political spectrum.

It is possible that the current weakness of the regime—arguably the lowest point it has faced since its establishment—combined with American determination to bring about its downfall, will motivate Iranian protest and opposition movements to rise above their narrow interests and agendas and cooperate once again with an initiative led by Reza Pahlavi to convene the first Iranian “Continental Congress” (which, symbolically, would be fittingly held in Philadelphia, United States).

Yet it is equally possible that the deep fragmentation of Iran’s protest and opposition movements will once again prevent meaningful cooperation, perpetuating the dysfunctional pattern that has thus far prevented them from posing a significant threat to the regime’s survival.

Either way, the authors of this column believe that the very attempt to convene such a congress under Pahlavi’s leadership—even if it ultimately fails to take place, takes place without significantly expanding the participant base beyond that of the Munich conference, or concludes without a joint declaration on a shared vision for the “day after”—could grant Pahlavi, both among Iranians and within the international community, the credibility and political capital required for the action plan outlined in the booklet to become, at least temporarily and until alternative agreements emerge, the guiding vision upon which the necessary frameworks can be built to bring the idea of an Exile Army into reality.