Nir Ben-David

When Digital Trust Threatens National Security

A nation can lose essential capabilities without a single bridge collapsing, a power station burning, or a military base being struck. Its infrastructure may remain physically intact while the digital systems that operate, connect, and protect it become unreliable.

National security increasingly depends on something less visible than concrete and steel: the mechanisms that allow institutions, machines, and people to establish trust.

In my previous article, The Hidden Quantum Risk in Infrastructure, I examined how cryptography authenticates connections, verifies software updates, and protects the integrity of communications within essential systems. Those dependencies extend beyond individual facilities. They form part of the digital foundations on which national resilience depends.

Quantum computing introduces a long-term challenge to some of those foundations. Governments must prepare for a future in which widely deployed cryptographic mechanisms may no longer provide the protection they were designed to deliver.

Digital trust is becoming a national security responsibility.

When trust becomes a national vulnerability

Israel’s experience illustrates how digital vulnerabilities can affect essential services and public confidence.

In October 2021, ransomware disrupted the computer systems of Hillel Yaffe Medical Center. Staff turned to manual procedures, non-urgent treatments were postponed, and the hospital worked to maintain essential care.

In December 2020, attackers breached the Israeli insurance company Shirbit, exposing sensitive personal information belonging to policyholders. Data held by a private organization became a matter of wider public concern.

A different dimension of digital trust emerged in June 2025, when Israel’s National Cyber Directorate warned of fraudulent messages impersonating the Home Front Command. Some falsely instructed citizens to avoid entering shelters, exploiting the authority of an institution responsible for public safety.

The attackers did not need to compromise an official communication system to make their messages appear authoritative. They relied on making false instructions appear to originate from a trusted source.

These incidents illustrate three dimensions of digital trust: the continuity of essential services, the confidentiality of sensitive information, and the ability to distinguish legitimate authority from deception.

The incidents themselves were unrelated to quantum computing. Their relevance lies in the importance of the digital relationships on which national security increasingly depends.

The quantum transition adds a longer-term concern: the reliability of the cryptographic mechanisms used to establish identity, verify authority, and protect the integrity of digital interactions.

The invisible dependencies of national resilience

Modern infrastructure operates through a web of interconnected services.

Electricity powers telecommunications. Communications enable emergency response, financial transactions, and transportation. Water treatment depends on reliable power and operational technology. Armed forces may rely on civilian infrastructure, commercial networks, and private suppliers.

When one service fails, others can struggle. National security planners recognize this pattern from the study of cascading failures across critical infrastructure.

Cryptography forms part of the connective tissue holding these systems together.

Public-key cryptography helps establish secure communications, authenticate digital identities, and verify software integrity. Digital signatures allow systems to check that software or instructions originate from an authorized source and have not been altered.

A sufficiently capable quantum computer could eventually undermine widely deployed public-key algorithms used for these purposes.

No publicly demonstrated quantum computer can yet break modern public-key cryptography at an operationally relevant scale. The timeline remains uncertain, but the consequences justify preparing today.

An attacker able to compromise vulnerable authentication or signature mechanisms could potentially impersonate trusted systems, forge digital signatures, or undermine the integrity of communications. The actual impact would depend on the systems involved, their configuration, and the independent safeguards protecting them.

The risk becomes more consequential when the same cryptographic mechanisms support multiple essential services.

A weakness affecting a shared foundation of digital trust can create vulnerabilities extending beyond the organization where it is first discovered.

For national security planners, the challenge is understanding how those shared dependencies affect the country’s ability to maintain essential functions.

Governments are beginning to respond

Governments increasingly recognize that cybersecurity must be coordinated across essential sectors.

In the United States, Executive Order 14028, issued in 2021 following major software supply-chain compromises, including SolarWinds, marked an important step toward stronger federal software security, greater transparency into software components, and the adoption of Zero Trust principles. Subsequent policy changes modified parts of that framework, but the challenge of securing interconnected digital infrastructure remains.

The European Union’s NIS2 Directive established a broader framework for cybersecurity risk management, accountability, and incident reporting across essential and important sectors.

Israel’s 2025 National Cybersecurity Strategy emphasizes the resilience of critical services, coordinated national defense, and preparedness for cyber crises. The National Cyber Defense Bill, approved in its first reading in June 2026, was referred to the Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee ahead of its second and third readings. The proposed legislation seeks to strengthen cybersecurity oversight and obligations affecting essential organizations and digital service providers.

These developments reflect a growing recognition that protecting essential digital functions requires national coordination.

The United States has also established a policy framework specifically addressing quantum-related cryptographic risks.

In May 2022, National Security Memorandum 10 directed federal preparations for the transition to quantum-resistant cryptography. Subsequent guidance from the Office of Management and Budget established requirements for federal agencies to identify and prioritize systems using cryptography vulnerable to a sufficiently capable quantum computer.

The Quantum Computing Cybersecurity Preparedness Act further reinforced federal responsibilities for identifying vulnerable information technology and preparing for migration.

Federal timelines have since been accelerated. In June 2026, the White House issued Executive Order 14412, Securing the Nation Against Advanced Cryptographic Attacks, directing OMB to require federal agencies to transition high-value assets and high-impact systems, other than national security systems, to post-quantum cryptography: key establishment by the end of 2030, and digital signatures by the end of 2031. The order also directs federal agencies to assist critical-infrastructure owners and operators in developing their own migration plans, but it does not itself require them to migrate. A separate proposed procurement rule would extend post-quantum requirements to federal contractors by the end of 2030.

The European Union has taken a parallel step. In June 2025, Member States, supported by the European Commission, published a coordinated roadmap calling for all Member States to begin transitioning to post-quantum cryptography by the end of 2026, and for critical infrastructure to be transitioned as soon as possible and no later than the end of 2030.

Together, these initiatives demonstrate how cryptographic modernization is becoming a matter of national and regional policy.

The greater challenge is translating policy into coordinated action across systems that governments do not fully own, operate, or control.

Cryptographic resilience as a national capability

Post-quantum cryptography offers a path toward protecting digital systems against attacks from sufficiently capable quantum computers. Implementing it across a national infrastructure requires more than adopting new algorithms.

A government can establish technical requirements for its own systems while remaining dependent on telecommunications providers, equipment manufacturers, cloud platforms, and industrial suppliers whose modernization schedules it does not control.

A hospital may depend on a medical device manufacturer. An electricity operator may rely on industrial controllers that cannot easily be upgraded. A defense organization may operate equipment requiring extensive certification before changes can be introduced.

Each organization may have a reasonable cybersecurity plan. The combined national picture can still remain incomplete.

Cryptographic resilience depends on three capabilities:

  • Visibility: Knowing where cryptographic mechanisms are deployed, which algorithms they use, and where vulnerabilities may emerge.
  • Operational understanding: Identifying the essential functions, dependencies, and trust relationships that rely on those mechanisms.
  • Adaptability: Ensuring that cryptographic protections can be replaced or strengthened without disrupting critical operations.

These capabilities must be developed together.

An inventory of algorithms that ignores operational significance produces incomplete priorities. A migration plan that overlooks supplier dependencies may prove impossible to execute. A technically successful security upgrade that interrupts an essential service can introduce a different kind of risk.

The transition must also account for different threat timelines. Sensitive information intercepted today may become vulnerable to future decryption, while attacks against digital signatures and public-key authentication depend on quantum capabilities that have yet to be demonstrated at the required scale.

Planners must coordinate these risks with infrastructure modernization cycles that may extend over many years. Decisions about priorities, resources, and responsibilities must therefore be made long before every technical uncertainty has been resolved.

From national strategy to national action

A credible national approach begins by identifying the digital trust dependencies essential to a country’s ability to function.

This requires cooperation among national authorities, infrastructure operators, technology suppliers, and sector regulators.

Five practical capabilities should form the foundation of a national readiness program:

  1. Identify critical dependencies. Map the cryptographic mechanisms supporting essential services, including privileged remote access, software updates, machine-to-machine authentication, and communications between critical systems.
  2. Assess operational consequences. Determine what could realistically happen if a mechanism became unreliable, which independent safeguards would remain effective, and how disruption could affect essential functions.
  3. Prioritize migration by risk. Account for information sensitivity, operational importance, supplier dependencies, and the time required for engineering, testing, and certification.
  4. Test before deployment. Establish controlled environments where operators and technology providers can evaluate post-quantum solutions without placing essential services at risk.
  5. Establish national accountability. Assign responsibility for coordinating readiness across sectors, monitoring progress, and resolving dependencies that individual organizations cannot address alone.

In November 2026, Malaysia announced that it is developing a national plan to transition critical information infrastructure to post-quantum cryptography. The proposed initiative includes cooperation among national security authorities, cybersecurity agencies, telecommunications regulators, and network operators, alongside a shared research and development testbed for evaluating solutions and accelerating the transition.

The initiative remains under development, but it illustrates a practical direction: national readiness requires coordinated experimentation, realistic migration planning, and cooperation across institutional boundaries.

Who owns the national picture?

Technology suppliers will play a central role in developing and implementing post-quantum security. Infrastructure operators remain responsible for the systems they manage, while regulators establish requirements within their respective sectors.

Each holds part of the information needed to assess national readiness.

A supplier may know when its products can support new algorithms without knowing how many essential services depend on them. An infrastructure operator may understand its own environment without recognizing that the same trust mechanism supports systems across several sectors.

A regulator may establish appropriate requirements without having visibility into dependencies shared with defense, emergency services, or other civilian infrastructure.

National authorities must connect these perspectives into a coherent picture of cryptographic risk and operational dependency.

Effective coordination requires clear responsibilities, shared methods for assessing risk, visibility into cross-sector dependencies, and measurable migration milestones.

Countries may assign this mandate to an existing national cybersecurity authority or establish a dedicated coordination function. Either approach can work if it has sufficient authority, access to relevant information, and the ability to coordinate across institutional boundaries.

The objective is practical accountability.

National security officials must understand the operational consequences of cryptographic failure. Infrastructure executives must plan for the resources and time needed to modernize long-lived systems. Policymakers must recognize that delayed decisions can narrow the options available later.

A national quantum-readiness strategy should build on existing cybersecurity frameworks by adding visibility into cryptographic dependencies, coordinated migration priorities, and clear responsibility for the systems on which national continuity depends.

Turning digital trust into a national asset

National security increasingly depends on digital mechanisms that establish identity, verify instructions, authenticate communications, and protect the integrity of essential systems.

Israel’s experience with cyber disruption and the impersonation of trusted authorities demonstrates why these relationships matter. A hospital’s ability to function, an organization’s responsibility to protect sensitive information, and a citizen’s confidence in an emergency instruction each depend on a different aspect of digital trust.

The quantum transition challenges the long-term reliability of some of the cryptographic foundations supporting those relationships.

Countries that map their cryptographic dependencies, establish clear responsibilities, and begin testing practical migration pathways today will be better positioned to maintain essential services as security requirements evolve.

Digital trust is part of the invisible architecture of national security. In the Quantum Era, preserving it will depend on stronger cryptography, coordinated national action, and the ability to adapt before existing protections become inadequate.

Next: Who Controls Your Quantum Security? — As countries prepare for the quantum transition, how much control do they actually have over the technologies, suppliers, and security mechanisms on which their future resilience depends?

About the Author
Nir Ben-David is a Brigadier General (Res.), entrepreneur, former senior military commander, and strategic advisor specializing in national security, quantum technologies, cybersecurity, and digital trust. He is the Founder & CEO of Qombat and an angel investor for the hardware-anchored post-quantum technology company, EigenQ. He writes about the intersection of emerging technologies, public policy, and global security.
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