Netanyahu’s next move to block cooperation with Arab parties: War on all fronts
The emerging results of the 2026 elections are in line with what I anticipated in my most recent commentary published in the days and weeks before the vote, here, here and here, Likud would emerge as the largest party, the best course of action for the opposition is a Jewish-Arab collaboration and that Netanyahu will hold all the cards.
At this stage, the opposition has 55 seats, I include Ra’am (the move with Segalovitz puts them inside the opposition), Netanyahu’s coalition has 53, and the Joint List has 12. Those numbers will change as the remaining ballots, including those cast by soldiers and reservists, are counted. I expect the Joint List to lose two or three seats and Ben Gvir to gain a seat or two, with Liberman and Bennett possibly gaining slightly as well. My estimate remains unchanged from several days ago: Netanyahu’s bloc will finish with 55–57 seats, opposition 53-55, as I wrote here.
The opposition will struggle to secure the support of the other Arab parties, which are not a unified political camp. Balad is not Ra’am, and neither is Hadash. The opposition will also have to maintain unity within its own ranks, with little room for defections.
As I argued before, Netanyahu still holds the strongest cards.
- He may be able to persuade several members of Eisenkot’s party to defect.
I have questioned whether the party vetted its candidates thoroughly enough. I suspect some would be willing to join Netanyahu in exchange for the right job. - He could offer either Liberman or Bennett (without Lapid) a rotation agreement, under which Netanyahu serves as prime minister for the first two or three years and then, if he is still with us, seeks the presidency. I think he could get the two to compete for such a deal.
- Even if he is not given the first opportunity to form a government, he can pursue a divide-and-conquer strategy, exploiting disagreements within the opposition and running down the clock.
But I think Netanyahu will choose the 4th option which is to ignite a war on multiple fronts: Iran, Lebanon, Gaza and perhaps the West Bank.
Such a war would make cooperation between the opposition and the Arab parties basically impossible. Eisenkot, Bennett and Liberman would struggle to accept the Arab parties’ positions during wartime. The Arab parties, in turn, would struggle to support the opposition parties’ Zionist agenda while such a war was underway. For Netanyahu, that would be an ideal political outcome.
That is why the opposition’s failure to campaign on the cost of living is so frustrating. As mentioned, it neglected a major vulnerability of the right, and Likud in particular, and probably left five or six seats on the table that it could have taken from the right-wing bloc.
The result may well be another election, an outcome that suits Netanyahu perfectly.
These elections were the opposition’s best opportunity, and it is now behind us. Demographic trends will make future contests harder. Only viable future for center-left in Israel is with 20% of the population – its Arab citizens.
