KSA and the UAE Await Trump With Eyes on Iran

The Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, are adopting a cautious stance toward Donald Trump’s anticipated return to the White House. While they usually welcome the Republican administrations, given a classic, natural affinity, Gulf rulers remain wary of policies that could exacerbate tensions, particularly regarding Iran. Trump is not a classic Republican.

At a recent conference in Abu Dhabi, UAE presidential adviser Anwar Gargash urged the incoming administration to adopt a “comprehensive” rather than “piecemeal” approach, reflecting the Gulf’s growing pragmatism after Trump’s first-term soft disappointments. Saudi and Emirati leaders now recognise the need for a more balanced stance to avoid regional destabilisation. This approach diverges from their previously more assertive alignment with Trump’s anti-Iran policies—that they shared. Gulf leaders today are less inclined to follow U.S. policies without question, as they did in the past.

A Turning Point: The 2019 Attack and a Shift in Security Dependence

The Gulf’s shift in perspective traces back to pivotal events, especially the 2019 Iran-backed missiles and drones attack on Saudi oil infrastructure, which momentarily crippled half of the kingdom’s oil output. Although the U.S. held Iran responsible (with the involvement of regional Shia militias linked to IRGC, among them the Houthis), Trump refrained from military retaliation, opting instead for increased sanctions. This response, or lack thereof, was a wake-up call for Gulf monarchies, highlighting the need to rethink their sole reliance on U.S. security assurances. Gulf leaders, particularly in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, realised that alternative strategies were necessary to protect their interests, leading to a reassessment of their regional security policies. As Giorgio Cafiero of Gulf State Analytics noted in a Financial Times analysis, by the end of Trump’s first term, the administration had ultimately failed to enhance security for these states, prompting an essential shift in Gulf thinking.

A Diplomatic Recalibration: China’s Role in the Saudi-Iran Reconciliation

Since then, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have pursued a more cautious diplomatic approach toward Iran, highlighted by the China-mediated reconciliation between Riyadh and Tehran in March 2023. Now prioritising economic development over confrontation, Saudi leaders view the agreement as an essential pillar of regional stability. This peace-building effort aligns with Saudi Vision 2030, which aims to shift the kingdom’s focus from oil dependency toward a diversified economy. In a strategic move, the Gulf states are leveraging China’s influence to provide alternative security partnerships and, in doing so, gain greater flexibility in regional affairs. Yet, these ambitions face a critical challenge: maintaining security, as any perceived instability could deter foreign investment and undermine the Gulf’s reputation as an emerging economic, financial, and touristic hub.

Balancing Global Ties: China and U.S. Relations on a “Strategic Tightrope”

Gulf countries are walking a “strategic tightrope,” balancing their growing economic ties with China and their longstanding security partnership with the U.S. However, Trump’s return raises concerns about an overly aggressive anti-Iran stance that could destabilise this balance significantly if the U.S. extends too much leeway to Israel to confront Tehran. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have also initiated tentative security cooperation with Iran, as evidenced by the recent visit of Saudi General Fayyad al-Ruwaili to Tehran. Additionally, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman hosted senior Iranian officials at a recent Arab-Muslim conference, where he condemned Israeli attacks in Gaza, advocating for a de-escalation of hostilities with Iran. These careful diplomatic moves reflect the Gulf’s strategic decision to maintain a complex and pragmatic relationship with Tehran, underscoring their commitment to avoid confrontations whenever possible.

The Witkoff Appointment: A Direct Line to Trump Amid Middle East Turmoil

Trump’s choice of Steve Witkoff as his envoy to the Middle East signals a strategic alignment of personal trust and diplomatic intent. Like Jared Kushner before him, Witkoff, a businessman from the real estate sector, brings negotiation skills but lacks a formal diplomatic background. His major asset, indeed, is his close relationship with Trump, underscored by years of personal loyalty and direct access. This connection, described as one of “deep trust,” grants Witkoff a unique authority to speak for Trump as he navigates complex regional tensions, including the escalating Gaza conflict and attempts to secure normalisation between Israel and Saudi Arabia. Trump’s ambitious goals for the region—ending the war in Gaza, advancing Saudi-Israeli normalisation, and even renewing efforts for Israeli-Palestinian peace—are interwoven with this high-stakes appointment. For the Gulf states, Witkoff’s appointment might bring both opportunity and risk, as his pro-Israel stance and close alignment with Trump could fuel apprehensions about escalating tensions with Iran, further straining an already delicate balance in the region.

A New Gulf and Trump’s Challenge in a Multipolar World

While Trump may aim for a grand regional bargain, the Gulf has evolved significantly since his last term. Today’s Gulf leaders are more assertive on the world stage, brokering deals such as OPEC+ with Russia, facilitating exchanges in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and strengthening ties with China and India. These countries are no longer solely dependent on U.S. security guarantees; they now play an active role in a multipolar world, adapting their alliances to maximise regional influence. Trump’s second term would encounter a Gulf region less reliant on U.S. narratives, more strategic in its partnership, and prepared to assert its own regional quiete and development vision—a Gulf interested in working with Washington but less willing to sacrifice its autonomy. Will Trump be able to balance his fully pro-Israel stance with the Gulf’s priorities, which not only criticise Israel but also oppose escalation with Iran? Will this require a sort of rethinking of the Abraham Accords’ boundaries?