Collateral Benefit

The real test raised by NAZA – the Hebrew military acronym for collateral damage – is not whether its filmmakers are right. It is whether a state confident in its force is equally confident in evidence, law and institutions strong enough to examine how that force was used.

If NAZA prompts the IDF to examine allegations, remedy failures or rebut accusations with evidence, that would itself be a collateral benefit for Israel, without requiring acceptance of its filmmakers’ conclusions.

Yuval Abraham and Rachel Szor’s film, which won the Special Jury Prize at the Venice Film Festival, presents anonymous testimony from soldiers and intelligence personnel about the war in Gaza. Its creators cite those accounts as evidence of a policy of killing civilians; the IDF rejects that claim. An award does not authenticate testimony, and anonymity does not invalidate it; its weight rests on the witness’s direct knowledge, verification of their role and corroboration.

Even credible testimony about an incident does not establish state policy or intent. But the film did not prepare the ground on which such allegations now land: Israelis whose office, rank or standing carries authority abroad publicly cast harm to civilians as a means to war aims.

Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich said of allowing two million civilians to die of hunger that “it might be justified and moral, until our hostages are returned”. Maj Gen (res.) Yiftah Ron-Tal, a former commander of the IDF Ground Forces, said that “no Gazans should remain in Gaza”.¹ Rabbi Shmuel Eliyahu revived the possibility of using a nuclear bomb on Gaza previously raised by his son, Minister Amichai Eliyahu.

Their words do not prove the film’s allegations, but they give them the appearance of internal validation. In January 2024, the International Court of Justice cited Israeli statements in its order on provisional measures; the Court did not find that genocide had occurred, but included those statements in its reasoning.²

The Spirit of the IDF, its ethical code, enshrines human life, purity of arms, reliability and responsibility alongside perseverance in the mission and pursuit of victory. Human dignity does not depend on nationality or religion. Values are tested precisely when violating them is easiest; examining allegations is part of applying them.

Israel’s enemies do not set Israel’s standard. Israel is not Hamas, Hezbollah, the Iranian regime or Erdogan’s Turkey. “They do it too” is not permission. Adopting their methods gives them power to shape Israel itself. The law sets the limits of force.

A strike against a military target can be lawful and justified even when civilian casualties are expected, provided the anticipated harm is not excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected and feasible precautions are taken. The decision is judged on the information available, or reasonably obtainable, when it was made; foreseeing civilian harm does not make civilians the target. Collateral-damage assessments exist to reduce harm, alter an operation or cancel it altogether.³

That determines what must be examined: the target, the quality of the intelligence, the alternatives considered and the authorisation given. Even when a computerised system assists the decision, responsibility remains with its operators and approvers. An allegation of policy reaches the decision-making level: who decided, what orders were given and what was authorised. That is how lawful conduct is distinguished from a violation and responsibility established at every level.

Public anger after 7 October is understandable, and the demand to protect Israeli citizens and defeat the enemy is legitimate. But anger is not an order. The public has every right to protest and influence policy; authority to use force and conduct investigations belongs to state institutions acting under law.

Independent scrutiny protects both the individual and the state: it binds the prosecution too and safeguards the rights of suspects and defendants. Internationally, that independence is an asset. Under the International Criminal Court’s principle of complementarity, genuine domestic proceedings take precedence over ICC intervention.⁴ A government asking the world to trust its institutions must allow them to reach conclusions it may dislike. Their mere existence is not the test; the test is whether the state is genuinely willing and able to investigate and prosecute. Subordinating investigators, prosecutors or judges to the political interests of those they scrutinise damages the credibility of Israel’s own process and weakens a security and diplomatic asset.

Culture Minister Miki Zohar’s demand that the filmmakers be stripped of their citizenship damages that credibility. It replaces scrutiny with a threat against the filmmakers. Artistic freedom leaves the dispute where it belongs: with the acts themselves. A leak investigation is no substitute for examining what the testimony describes.

The IDF was sent to defend a Jewish and democratic state. The character of the state that remains after the war is part of the war’s outcome.

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This essay is adapted from a Hebrew column published in Maariv on September 17, 2026, under the title “תועלת אגבית: גם אם דוחים את ‘נז״א’ – את הטענות חייבים לבדוק”.

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Related by the same author:

• “With Law, Without Illusions – Rabin, Leadership and Responsibility”, The Times of Israel, November 3, 2025.
• “No Hands on Soldiers”, The Times of Israel, November 16, 2025.
• “Aiding the Enemy in Wartime from Within”, The Times of Israel, April 23, 2026.
• “An Armed Fringe Is Not Defending Israel. It Is Hijacking the State”, The Times of Israel, July 26, 2026.
• “Altalena Was the Moment Israel Chose to Become a State”, The Times of Israel, August 30, 2026.

Related interview:

• Jerusalem Report Staff, “Gaining exposure at IAI”, The Jerusalem Post, October 13, 2024.
  On credibility in wartime: reliable information, restraint in claims, and responsibility for both the good and the bad.

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1. Author’s translation from Hebrew. Maj Gen (res.) Yiftah Ron-Tal, former commander of the IDF Ground Forces, interview with Kol Chai, February 20, 2025. Ron-Tal said: “I increasingly understand that no Gazans should remain in Gaza.” Original Hebrew interview

2. International Court of Justice, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v. Israel), Order on Provisional Measures, January 26, 2024. The order did not determine the merits of the genocide allegation. Official ICJ order

3. ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Database, Rule 14 on proportionality in attack and Rule 15 on feasible precautions. Rule 14 also records state practice requiring attack decisions to be assessed on the information available at the relevant time.

4. Rome Statute, Article 17; ICC Office of the Prosecutor, Policy on Complementarity and Cooperation, April 2024. Complementarity requires an assessment of whether relevant domestic proceedings exist and, where they do, whether unwillingness or inability prevents the state from carrying them out genuinely.